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CROSS-BORDER CANADA/U.S. COOPERATION IN
INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS VIS
VIS PRIVATE PARTIES

A

Konradvon Finckenstein

First of all, I am delighted to be here. For three years, Henry has invited
me. This year, finally, I managed to make it rather than sending a deputy.
Debra just finished off saying we need to exchange information. I totally
agree. There is actually a bill before Parliament and a discussion is going to
take place on Monday. There is going to be a big public debate in Canada on
that very point. But, let me quickly run through what we do on the criminal
side, having heard from Debra Valentine on the civil side.
First of all, the Canadian Competition Bureau is basically the Federal
Trade Commission and the Deputy Attorney General (Antitrust) in the
United States rolled into one. We are responsible for the Competition Act
and three labeling acts. So we have the responsibility for addressing both
anti-competitive conduct and consumer information.
In the current business environment there are new challenges. The
elimination of barriers to trade, and tremendous market integration, both in
North America and globally. There is the challenge of E-commerce on the
Internet that brings new business models, new ways of doing business.
All of this has a tremendous impact in terms of competition and,
unfortunately, also in terms of illegal competition. Today's anti-competitive
activity operates on a continental and/or a global scale. We see coordinated
conspiracies that are systematically planned, literally splitting up the globe in
different markets deciding who gets what share. In order to fight this kind of
continental and global anti-competitive conduct, we need coordinated
competition law enforcement, and cooperation both at the bilateral and
multilateral level.
With such coordination, there will be synergies. First of all, we must
make sure we do not get in the way of each others' attempts at investigation
or accidentally tip off somebody. In terms of remedies, we seek to ensure that
they work together, rather than cross purposes. Second, we get much more
information through access to a wider information pool. We find out things
that we do not know about our own country and vice-versa. The idea is to try
to make sure that borders cannot be used as a shield. Enforcement has to
work on a global scale since we are dealing with conduct on a global scale.
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I want to talk about three topics today. First of all, what we do in Canada
and the United States with regard to criminal investigations. Second, I would
like to address some new laws, initiatives, and tools that we have developed
in Canada. Lastly, I would like to point out future priorities.
We have seen a three-fold increase in joint investigations between
Canada and the United States since 1995. It is really quite unbelievable what
is going on in this field. There has been very vigorous prosecution by the
Attorneys General, both in the United States and in Canada, resulting in
unprecedented fines. We used to achieve fines up to a million dollars. One
over a million dollars used to be a big thing. This year, we had a single fine
of forty-eight million dollars; the largest fine ever levied in Canadian
criminal history. Last year alone, we collected over 100 million dollars,
which, by Canadian standards, is just unheard of.
For instance, we had a case involving pharmaceutical companies and
vitamins. It was a conspiracy among some German, French, Japanese, Swiss,
and American firms, who were meeting to carve up the market for Vitamin
E. They decided who gets what, what the sales rate would be, and what the
price levels would be. They started out with twenty-five percent of the
Japanese market. Their sales grew to thirty-three percent, so their sales had to
slow down, otherwise they would go over their target. All of this was
actually taped and it was fascinating. So it was, in effect, a systematic
criminal activity meant to hurt the consumer.
We also obtained fines against two foreign nationals. Interestingly
enough, one of these foreign nationals was quite willing to be fined, but he
would not set foot in North America because he was afraid that the moment
he came to Canada, we would get an extradition request from the Americans.
Under our law, you can plead guilty through videoconference. So, we
actually had a videoconference with the man in Switzerland. He pled guilty
and was fined. He paid his fine, but he never came to North America.
We also had a former Vice President of a company sentenced to nine
months imprisonment. It is very unusual to imprison an executive in Canada.
On the other hand, it sends quite a distinct message through the business
community that this is really serious business.
We also have a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) with the
Americans. It is really a very useful tool because, essentially, it allows us to
send our requests to the Americans, and the Americans can send requests to
us. On the basis of such requests, we can use court processes in order to
coordinate our searches. We do them at the same time on both sides of the
border. The evidence gets seized and it can be exchanged. A perfect example
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of the use of the MLAT was in the fax paper case, 1 which resulted in guilty

pleas and fines.
What are some of the new tools we are using? With recent Competition
Act amendments, there is now a new offense of deceptive telemarketing. If
you are a telemarketer and, for example, you insist on payment before you
deliver a prize or something, that is an offense and can result in
imprisonment and fines. The reason we use this approach is, the task force
that Debra talked about found out that of the 400 billion dollar telemarketing
business, ten percent of it is illicit. For the Canadian part, just divide that by
ten. So that is a four billion dollar hit to the Canadian market. What has
happened, of course, has completely cast a negative image on legitimate
business. What we wanted to do was protect legitimate business but, at the
same time, we wanted to go after the illicit ones. So we figured the best way
to do that was to enact a standard of behavior. If they stay within the rules,
fine. If not, then we will go after them.
Additionally, we now have the authority to wire tap for price fixing,
market allocation, bid rigging, and deceptive telemarketing. Of course, you
do have to prove you have reasonable cause to use wire-tapping. If possible
you must use a less intrusive tool such as search and seizure. Search and
seizure is less intrusive than wire tapping, the way our laws are written.
Also, we now have authority to seek interim injunctions and third-party
injunctions against people who supply illicit telemarketers. These people can
be prohibited from supplying these companies. So not only can you go after
the telemarketer, but you can also go after his or her source of supply, and
you can hold both of them liable.
Finally, we also provided specific whistle blower protection. In order to
protect the identity of a person reporting offenses and to make sure that the
employee is protected as much as possible against reprisal by the employer,
we made it a criminal offense in Canada for a company to take action against
an employee who has blown the whistle.
We also recently revised our immunity policy. We have emulated the
U.S. model. It is a very straightforward program. It says that if you become
party to a conspiracy, if you come forward and you are the first to do so, then
we will recommend immunity; if the Attorney General agrees, she will grant
immunity. We are prepared to offer this deal in two circumstances: One
when we are unaware of the crime; and two, if the person who is first to
come forward does so when we are aware of the offense but do not have
enough evidence to refer the case for prosecution. This does not apply to the
leader or the instigator of the conspiracy. This is very important because once
I U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1996), rev'd 109 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. Mass. 1997).
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there is a question that somebody may be blowing the whistle, the greater
incentive is for the instigator to come forward. Most of these cases start in
the United States, because exposure there is greater than in Canada, and we
did not want to have the instigator come forward and have to be put in a
position to give them immunity, instead of a less culpable party.
The cooperating party must terminate the illegal activity. They have to
provide timely and complete cooperation and be fully truthful. Cooperation
has to be full, continuous, and expeditious. If you hold anything back, or you
are party to a second conspiracy and you do not tell us that, in effect, it may
void immunity on the first offense.
In order to seek immunity, you must take the following steps: You must
first contact the Bureau. Often this is done through counsel to maintain
anonymity. Then you seek a provisional guarantee, based on a hypothetical
disclosure of information. Then full disclosure is made with the Attorney
General executing the immunity agreement.
Such requests for immunity are usually initiated by a party who has been
involved in an offense. However, there may be situations when the Bureau
approaches a target of an investigation. We may have suspicions about the
company and have some information. We have looked at the various people
who are most likely involved. Then, we may decide to approach the company
who is the most appropriate candidate for immunity. Then we inform them of
the existence of our immunity program. If they come forward, then we can
recommend immunity. We have found this to be effective. Americans have
dealt the same way with the large conspiracies.
The key is that the process goes forward in both jurisdictions. It usually
starts in the United States. There is great exposure in the United States, you
have civil exposure and treble damages. You normally contact the United
States first. Similarly, were we have been contacted first, we will urge the
applicants to go to other jurisdictions as well. We will not restrict disclosure
to other jurisdictions unless there is something covert going on. The
Americans apply the same rule. This is absolutely key in terms of our
cooperation. When someone comes to Canada first, we recommend that they
go down South.
The key is for the applicants to understand that there is no reward for
being first outside Canada. You must be first in vis-h-vis the relevant
jurisdiction. This is something both Joel Klein and I live by. It's essential, if
you want to take care of all jurisdictions where you may be exposed, to be
first in in each of those jurisdictions. Otherwise, what can happen is
somebody jumps the gun, and you get immunity in the States, but you do not
get it in Canada or vice-versa. Unfortunately, we have had cases like that.

von Finckenstein-COOPERATONIN INVESTIGATIONS -

We have a cooperation agreement, which provides for notification,
cooperation, and information exchange. We have the same thing with the
European Union (E.U.). It has the same kind of effect. It also has a very
significant side effect. The E.U. has a very open process. They have hearings
where the staff presents its view once it has finished its work. The merging
party presents its view, and the opposing party presents its view. This is an
open hearing, so they lay all the facts on the table. Signatories with the E.U.
on cooperation, such as the United States and Canada, can participate in
those hearings; therefore, we can learn a lot of information that is very
relevant. Since the E.U. has very strict time periods in which they have to
approve mergers, they usually are one of the first ones to deal with them.
Now I'd like to address future priorities. The 1995 Canada/U.S.
Agreement is an excellent model. We want to have other agreements like it
with our other trade partners. We are in the process of negotiating an
agreement with Chile. We are also negotiating with Australia and New
Zealand. They are considered the leaders in terms of innovative advances in
competition policy, and we are setting our sights on the Mexicans as well.
One of the points Debra mentioned was positive comity. The United
States and the E.U. have a positive comity agreement. We are in the process
of discussing one with the United States. The whole idea of positive comity
is to avoid extraterritorial problems. When you have an issue that affects both
sides of the border, positive comity involves one jurisdiction asking the other
to take appropriate action, take charge of the matter, investigate it, and find a
resolution that would solve the problem in both jurisdictions. The other
agency will, therefore, hold off.
Technically speaking, such an agreement reserves the right to step in.
Accordingly, one thing that is absolutely important is that the agencies
involved are constantly in touch with each other, because the agency that
holds back waiting for the other one to act is under considerable domestic
pressure to do something, and is constantly being barraged with requests and
petitions and the like. So it has to be able to find out what is happening. To
tell a country to wait for further development is not good enough.
On the other hand, under the U.S./E.U. agreement, matters have to be
resolved within a time frame of six months. I think the experience between
the United States and the E.U. has shown that six months is far too short to
deal with these problems. We should probably try to work out a more
flexible time frame.
There is also, as I mentioned, the International Antitrust Enforcement
Assistance Act.2 It is a wonderful tool that has been enacted by Congress. It
2

International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212.
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allows, in effect, the exchange of documents with another country in all
antitrust matters provided there is equal protection for the confidentiality. We
do not have such an act. We have a bill before Parliament that we hope will
be enacted which will permit us to apply the MLAT criminal antitrust
process to non-criminal antitrust matters.
At the same time, we are pushing very hard to have competition be part
of the new round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. This
issue failed in Seattle but, hopefully, it will come back again. I am convinced
in the long run that we need common standards in terms of basic principles
and basic procedures of competition. This hodge-podge that we see around
the world right now is not helpful and it can be abused. You can use
competition law to foster national champions. You should not, but the
temptation may be there, especially in some world nations. The WTO is very
important and Canada remains a firm advocate for inclusion at the WTO of a
regime of competition essentially modeled on the intellectual property
model: general principles, general procedure rules, and implementation
according to each countries' laws, traditions, and procedures. I think there
probably should be no dispute settlement because dispute settlement ties into
individual decisions, but peer review may be appropriate to measure
implementation.
So, in closing, all I can say is Canada and the U.S. are models of
cooperation on competition law, basically because our laws are very similar.
We have the same attitude. It is also much easier than in the trade policy area
because there is no implicit protection in competition law for domestic
industries. Competition by definition is blind to ownership, and neither of us
has an overt or covert idea of fostering national champions, so we both look
at competition law to be nothing more than a means to ensure a competitive,
fair market. We have worked very closely on the criminal side. We have
worked daily on the merger side. It is a model that is very much used in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to show how
cooperation can work, and we hope that we can foster this on a multi-lateral
basis.
Thank you.

